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summary overview
On December 12 2012 North Korea 
surprised the world by successfully placing a 
remote sensing satellite in a sun synchronous 
orbit using an indigenously developed launcher 
called the Unha.
In accordance with international norms 
of behavior associated with such launches over 
international waters North Korea had sent 
a notification to the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) about the launch window 
as well as the impact zones for the first stage, 
the second stage and the heat shroud.
Using publicly available information and 
images of the Unha launcher as well as the 
specific information on the first stage put out 
by South Korea after recovering and analyzing 
the debris from the first stage, the International 
Strategic & Security Studies Programme (ISSSP) 
at the National Institute of Advanced Studies 
(NIAS) attempted to reconstruct the trajectory 
of the successful launch.
From a given launch site there are in 
principle many trajectories that can inject a 
satellite into a specified orbit. If the physical 
dimensions of the rocket, the number of stages 
and the amount of fuel are known the number 
of possible trajectories will reduce. In addition 
if the impact points of the different stages of 
the rocket are known the number of possible 
trajectories can be reduced further since these 
impact points will determine the latitude, 
longitude, altitude and velocity at which the 
burnout of the stages will occur. Normally the 
final stage of the rocket also goes into orbit. 
Therefore if we know the achieved orbit of the 
injected satellite we can also reconstruct the 
trajectory of the final stage.
For the December 12 2012 launch of 
the Unha, all this information was available 
or reasonable estimates could be made from 
images of the launcher. This enables us to 
reconstruct the trajectory flown by the Unha 
launcher with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
Through an iterative process we were able 
to obtain a trajectory that matches well with the 
midpoints of the notified impact zones as well 
as the achieved orbit.
Based on the results from our reconstructed 
trajectory we were also able to make certain 
inferences about North Korea’s Space and 
Missile Capabilities.
The analysis suggests that North 
Korea is somewhat more advanced 
than either Iran or Pakistan in space 
and missile technologies and products. 
This assessment, more than the actual 
performance of the Unha launcher as a 
missile, must be a source of considerable 
concern to North Korea’s immediate 
neighbours as well as the United States.
The available evidence based on the 
recovery of the first stage debris by South Korea 
indicates that the first stage of the Unha Launcher 
comprises a cluster of four Nodong Engines 
that have a common turbo pump and common 
tanks for the kerosene propellant and the RFNA 
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oxidizer. The first stage sea level specific impulse 
that best fits the trajectory is only 229 seconds 
as compared to the initial assumed value of 
232 seconds. This is consistent with a Kerosene 
RFNA fuel and oxidizer combination typical 
of the original Scud A Soviet era technology 
that has been modified and scaled up for a 
space booster application. The addition of 
four vernier engines and their integration into 
a unified stage with autonomous control also 
represents a significant move away from the 
crude graphite jet vane control systems of the 
early Scud A technology used in the Nodong, 
Pakistan’s Ghauri as well as Iran’s Shahab 3. 
Though the technology is old the scaling up 
and improvements do indicate significant 
capabilities within North Korea.
The second stage of the Unha does not use 
a Nodong engine as assumed by most analysts. 
We found that the second stage vacuum specific 
impulse that best fits the trajectory is about 
270 seconds. This is not compatible with the 
250 to 255 seconds vacuum specific impulse 
of the Nodong that uses a kerosene RFNA fuel 
oxidizer combination. The thrust of the engine 
that powers this stage is also much lower than 
that of the Nodong engine suggesting that 
the stage and the engine are optimized for a 
satellite launch and not directly derived from 
a missile application. The second stage most 
probably uses a UDMH RFNA fuel and oxidizer 
combination that is compatible with the Scud B 
technology of the Soviet era.
Though it would have been easier for the 
North Korea to have used a regular missile 
engine for the Unha second stage they choose 
to develop an engine and stage specifically 
designed for a satellite mission. This indicates 
a substantial in-house capability that has built 
upon imported technology to not only improve 
it but to use the knowledge acquired to scale-
up, re-design, develop, test and launch a new 
stage.
Our Trajectory Model also suggests that 
the third stage uses an advanced engine with 
a specific impulse in the range of 288 to 290 
seconds. The results also suggest that this is a 
light weight stage with a high propellant load 
factor of around 86%. The engine that powers 
this stage uses an advanced propellant oxidizer 
combination such as UDMH and Nitrogen 
Tetroxide. This propellant and oxidizer 
combination was not used in the Scud series 
development. North Korea’s possession of this 
stage indicates that they have the knowledge 
and capabilities to indigenously design, develop, 
test and integrate such an advanced engine 
and stage into a space launcher. This is no 
mean achievement for a supposedly backward 
country like North Korea.
Apart from these hard technological 
achievements related to the development of 
the propulsion units and the stages for the 
Unha, the launch provides visible evidence that 
North Korea has been able to integrate these 
hard technologies with the softer technologies 
of mission planning and management of a 
complex project.
The vehicle trajectory including the 
maneuvers after liftoff, the pitching down of 
the second stage after first stage separation, 
maintaining control during the fairly long coast 
phase, the yaw maneuver of the third stage 
and the final injection into a fairly good sun 
synchronous orbit shows a strong and well-
developed internal organization of effort within 
North Korea. The division of work and the 
integration of these various diverse subsystems 
and components into a whole launcher and the 
planning and execution of the launch mission 
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show that North Korea has made commendable 
progress in its mastery of missile and space 
launcher products and technologies.
Though the Unha has been primarily 
designed for a space application it can also be 
used as a missile.
The range of the Unha with a 1000 kg 
payload launched due north towards the US or 
Canada is 5950 Km.
A due North East launch from the Launch 
site with a 1000 kg payload (sufficient for a 
nuclear warhead) can reach most parts of Alaska.
4
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bacKgrouNd
On December 12 2012 North Korea success-
fully placed a 100 kg Kwanmongsong satellite 
into a 494km by 588 km sun synchronous orbit 
used by remote sensing satellites.1
Prior to the actual launch North Korea 
had also sent a notification to the International 
Maritime Organization about the launch 
window and the impact zones for the first 
stage, the second stage as well as the heat 
shroud that protects the satellite during the 
ascent phase of the trajectory.2,3 These zones 
differed slightly from the earlier notified zones 
that North Korea had communicated for the 
third flight of the Unha launcher which failed 
on April 12 2012.4
From a given launch site there are in 
principle many trajectories that can inject a 
satellite into a specified orbit. If the physical 
dimensions of the rocket, the number of stages 
and the amount of fuel are known the number 
of possible trajectories will reduce. In addition 
if the impact points of the different stages of 
the rocket are known the number of possible 
trajectories can be reduced further since these 
impact points will determine the latitude, 
longitude, altitude and velocity at which the 
burnout of the stages will occur. Normally the 
final stage of the rocket also goes into orbit. 
Therefore if we know the achieved orbit of the 
1 Jonathan’s Space Report, No. 671, 2012 Dec 12 Somerville, MA USA was the first report put out in the public 
domain based on data from NORAD
2 The announcement for the April 12 2012 launch did not include a splashdown zone for the heat shroud.
3 Though this is the fifth attempt by North Korea to place a satellite in orbit it is only the fourth attempt using the 
Unha launcher.
4 David Wright, “North Korea Gives Location Of Splashdown Zones, Begins Assembling Rocket”, Union of Con-
cerned Scientists, All Things Nuclear, December 4 2012, at http://allthingsnuclear.org/north-korea-gives-loca-
tion-of-splashdown-zones-begins-assembling-rocket/
5 An earlier report put out by the International Strategic and Security Studies Programme (ISSSP) of the National 
Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) assumed that it was too risky for North Korea to carry out the yaw maneuver 
and only analyzed a simple in plane launch that gives an orbit inclination of 88 degrees. See footnote 7.
injected satellite we can also reconstruct the 
trajectory of the final stage.
For the December 12 2012 launch of the 
Unha, all this information was available or 
estimates could be made from images of the 
launcher. This enables us to reconstruct the 
trajectory flown by the Unha launcher with a 
reasonable degree of accuracy.
Given the location of the launch site and 
the splashdown zones for the spent stages 
of the rocket, it is clear that North Korea has 
successfully carried out a fairly complex yaw 
maneuver during the operation of the third 
stage of the rocket to change the inclination 
of the orbit from about 88 degrees to the 97.4 
degree inclination needed by a 500 km sun 
synchronous remote sensing satellite. Though 
North Korea had indicated even prior to the 
failed April 2012 flight that they were planning 
a launch into a sun synchronous orbit, analysts 
including some in India were skeptical whether 
they would indeed achieve such a capability.5
The successful launch into a difficult-to-
achieve orbit has forced analysts across the 
world to revise their assessments of North 
Korea’s space and missile capabilities. The 
recovery of the first stage debris from the sea 
by South Korea and the subsequent findings 
that they have made public, provide additional 
inputs for evaluating the Unha launcher and 
validating its technical parameters.6
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The International Strategic and Security 
Studies Programme (ISSSP) at the National 
Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) which had 
earlier brought out a report on the earlier failed 
Unha 3 launch7 also decided to re-assess North 
Korea’s Space and Missile capabilities in the 
light of this new information. This report that 
is based upon our earlier work will hopefully 
complement work that is currently going on 
across the world to understand the enigma 
that is North Korea. The technical perspective 
that we bring may provide some insights that 
could help decipher North Korea’s motives and 
aspirations for pursuing these difficult space 
and missile technologies.
highlights of the south Korea 
report oN the first stage debris 
of the uNha lauNcher
As mentioned earlier after recovering the 
debris of the first stage South Korea has put 
out their evaluation of the first stage of North 
Korea’s Unha Launcher.8
Their findings are briefly summarized below.
The first stage is made up of a cluster of 
four Nodong engines.9
These four engines use common tanks 
and turbo pumps for transferring the fuel and 
oxidizer to the four separate engines.
The fuel used is kerosene.
The oxidizer used is Red Fuming Nitric 
Acid (RFNA).10
Four independent smaller vernier engines 
are used for providing pitch and yaw control for 
the launcher during the operation of the first 
stage. This is different from the jet vane control 
used in the typical Nodong/ Scud missile.
The diameter of the first stage is 2.4 m
The overall length of the first stage is 15 
m. The length of the engine cluster is 2.7 m.
They also state that the ratio of the volume 
of the propellant tank to the volume of the 
oxidizer tank is 0.67.
The thrust of each of the Nodong engines 
is estimated to be 27 tonnes. The thrust of 
the vernier engines is put at 3 tones. Together 
the four Nodong engines and the four vernier 
engines provide a combined thrust of 120 
tonnes for the first stage.11
Though South Korea has recovered only 
the first stage of the Unha launcher they also 
make some inferences about the second and 
third stages as well as the satellite. Their 
estimate of the Gross mass of the Unha launcher 
is 90 tonnes out of which they indicate that 48 
tonnes would be the oxidizer.12 This seems to be 
6 An English translation of South Korea’s report has been put out David Wright. See” North Korean Long-range Mis-
sile Debris Survey” Ministry of Defense, (English translation by D. Wright revised 1/27/13) available at http://
www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/SK-report-on-NK-rocket-debris-analysis-translation-1-18-13.pdf
7 S.Chandrashekar, N. Ramani, RajaramNagappa, “North Korea’s Unha 3 Space Launch”, International Strategic 
and Security Studies Programme,  National Institute of Advanced Studies Report R10-2012, August 2012.
8 See footnote 6
9 The Nodong is a single stage missile scaled up and derived from Soviet Scud technology that North Korea ex-
ported to Pakistan where it is known as the Ghauri and to Iran where it is known as the Shahab 3.
10 Red Fuming Nitric Acid is a common oxidizer used in rocketry
11 Our trajectory model assumes a thrust of about 128 tonnes for the first stage. From our trajectory model values of 
120 tonnes thrust are not sufficient to place the satellite in orbit.
12 The report makes it clear that these are estimated. They are not based on measurements made on recovered de-
bris. The South Korean report of a Gross Mass of 90 tonnes appears to be on the higher side. The Gross Mass of 
the Vehicle that matches with the impact points and the achieved orbit is a shade under 80 tonnes.
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based on the assumption that both the second 
as well as the third stage engines of the Unha 
use the same RFNA and kerosene as oxidizer 
and fuel respectively.13
Our earlier report on the failed Unha 3 
launch used images of the Unha launcher to 
estimate the dimensions of the various stages 
of the missile. These dimensions were derived 
on the assumption that the second stage was a 
Nodong with a diameter of 1.35 m. This value 
was used to estimate the various tank lengths 
and diameters for the stages, the length of the 
engines and the length of the satellite. The tank 
length values were converted to propellant 
masses and stage masses using missile 
engineering expert knowledge.
This data was then used to run a trajectory 
model that tried to fit the impact zone data 
with the trajectory. Through an iterative process 
that also involved some additional mass to be 
put into the second and third stages we were 
able to obtain a reasonable match between the 
trajectory and the impact zones of the spent 
first and second stage.14
The availability of new information on 
the first stage as well as the clear evidence 
that North Korea had carried out a fairly 
sophisticated yaw maneuver during the flight of 
the third stage of the Unha launch to change the 
plane of the orbit from about 88 degrees to the 
97.4 degrees required for a sun synchronous 
orbit made it necessary to revisit and update 
our earlier findings.15
The new information on the first stage16 
was used to re-estimate the propellant and 
stage masses for the Unha launcher. Using 
these estimates we then used our trajectory 
programme through an iterative process to fit 
the vehicle parameters with the known impact 
points of the first stage the shroud and the 2nd 
stage. This iterative process provides us with 
a baseline for looking at the performance 
of the third stage and working out the 
requirements for achieving orbit. We can then 
examine how North Korea may have acquired 
the capabilities to build such stages and the 
consequent implications for the future. This 
approach will also reveal the adequacy or 
the inadequacy of the assumptions we make 
regarding the various parameters such as 
propellant masses, stage masses as well as the 
thrusts and specific impulses of the various 
stages.
The detail of the iterative process that 
was used to match the performance of the 
Unha 4 with the known impact points of the 
spent stages and the achieved orbit is provided 
below.17
13 Since the specific impulse of the Kerosene RFNA combination is on the lower side this implies that more fuel and 
oxidizer may be needed for providing the required increase in velocity for reaching orbit.
14 See footnote 7 Table 4 p 17 for the launcher parameters that match the mid points of the impact zones for the first 
and second stages.
15 There are some major differences between our current analysis and the earlier analysis. In the earlier analysis a 
pitch down maneuver was carried out by the third stage after second stage burnout. This is carried out when the 
launcher velocity is about 4 km per sec and involves a significant penalty in terms of the delta v needed. The yaw 
maneuver was also not factored in since we did not expect North Korea to be able to perform such a risky maneu-
ver. In our current version the pitch down maneuver is carried out by the second stage immediately after the first 
stage burnout.
16 The diameter of the second stage is about 1.4 m and that of the third stage is about 1.2 m
17 The mid points of the impact zones specified by North Korea have been used to shape the trajectory.
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matchiNg trajectory aNd the 
empirical data
The first step involved was to update the 
parameters of the Unha launcher based on the 
debris analysis put out by South Korea. Knowing 
that the diameter of the first stage was 2.4 m 
this involved updating all measurements on the 
image of the Unha launcher we had used in our 
earlier report.18 The baseline configuration that 
we arrived at is provided in Table 1.
The launcher has a Lift-Off Weight (LOW) 
of 79067 kg. The specific impulse assumed 
for the first stage, the second stage and the 
third stage were 232 seconds (Isp sea level), 
255 seconds (Isp Vacuum) and 260 seconds 
(Isp vacuum) for the first, second and third 
stages respectively.20 This was based on the 
assumption that the three stages used the same 
fuel and oxidizer combination of kerosene and 
Red Fuming Nitric Acid (RFNA).
Without worrying too much about whether 
the satellite would achieve orbit we ran our 
trajectory model to try and match the impact 
points of the first and second stages only.
Our experiments with different pitch 
angles21 and azimuth angles22 quickly revealed 
that simultaneously matching the impact points 
of the first and second stages with vehicle 
configuration parameters of Table 1 was very 
difficult. If the first stage impact point was 
matched the second stage reached a very high 
altitude making the second stage fall far short of 
18 See footnote 7. Our earlier assessment was based on the assumption that the second stage was a Nodong deriva-
tive with a diameter of 1.35 m
19 For a booster stage it is more appropriate to use the sea level thrust and Isp values. Based on empirical data typical 
variation of thrust with altitude has been modeled and incorporated into our trajectory software. A 10% variation 
in thrust and a similar variation in Isp values seem appropriate based on a sample of values estimated from typical 
booster stages. For the upper stages it is more appropriate to use vacuum values of thrust as well as Isp.
20 This assumption assumes that the second stage as well as the third stage use RFNA and Kerosene as oxidizer and 
fuel respectively.
21 A vertical trajectory – straight up from the launch pad has a pitch angle as per our convention of 90 degrees.
22 A due north launch from the launch site has an azimuth of zero degree. Azimuth can change from zero to 360 
degrees.




Propellant mass stage 1 (kg) 55287
Inert mass stage2 (kg) 10531
Stage mass (kg) 65817
Fuel fraction 0.84
Thrust Sea level (Newtons)19 1318598
Isp Sea Level (seconds) 232
Burn time computed (seconds) 95.33
Area of cross section (m2) 4.52
Stage 2 Parameters
Propellant mass stage 2 (kg) 8755
Inert mass stage 2 (kg) 2327




Burn time computed (seconds) 104.29
Area of cross section (m2) 1.52
Stage 3 Parameters
Propellant mass stage 3 (kg) 1449
Inert mass stage 3 (kg) 318




Burn time computed (seconds) 40
Area of cross section(m2) 1.02
Satellite mass (kg) 100
Shroud mass (kg) 300
Lift off weight (kg) 79067
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its actual impact location. Matching the impact 
point of the second stage with such a trajectory 
called for a major pitch down maneuver of 
the second stage that would consume a lot of 
the propellant of the second stage.23 Given the 
physical constraints of first and second stage 
sizes these did not appear feasible trajectories 
to pursue.
One way to reduce the altitude that the 
second stage could reach (an altitude at the 
end of the coasting of the third stage close to 
500 km is needed) is to increase the weight of 
the second stage. However the measurements 
from the image only permit a marginal increase 
in the weight of the second stage. It was also 
clear that such marginal increases would not 
affect the location of the impact point of the 
second stage in any significant way. The weight 
of the third stage of course would be a major 
determinant of the trajectory of the second 
stage. It is therefore important to make sure 
that before engaging in any major iterative 
process we get a reasonable idea of the weight 
of the third stage.
The third stage is required to perform 
two major functions. It has to perform a yaw 
maneuver to change the inclination plane of 
the orbit from 88 degrees to the 97.4 degrees 
required for a sun synchronous orbit. In 
23 Our preliminary calculations suggest that a velocity correction of about 200 metres per second is required to 
achieve a 5 degree pitch down of the second stage immediately after the burnout of the first stage when the 
launcher is travelling at a velocity of about 2 km per second.
24 From the trajectory run with an 89.1 degree pitch angle we could get some idea of the altitude and velocity 
reached by the third stage during the coasting phase. Using this velocity and knowing that the yaw maneuver 
requires a 10 degree change and knowing the velocity needed for a 500 km circular orbit the initial mass to final 
mass ratio can be computed for various fuel fractions and Isp. From these propellant masses and inert weights can 
be derived that are compatible with the required velocity change for yaw corrections as well as orbit insertion. 
This exercise also suggested that the specific impulse of the third stage had to much higher than that provided by 
a RFNA kerosene stage. The value of 1800 kg propellant and 395 kg inert mass for the stage was obtained through 
such a process. These values were used only as a starting point for the iteration.
25 Obviously increasing the propellant loading would continue to decrease this altitude. However it may not be pos-
sible to accommodate so much propellant given the dimensional constraints revealed by our image analysis. 1800 
kg seems to be a reasonable compromise.
addition it has to provide the required velocity 
to the third stage at the end of the coasting 
phase to inject it into a near 500 km orbit. The 
propellant loading of the third stage, the inert 
mass of the stage as well as the specific impulse 
are all important parameters for achieving the 
velocity required.
Based upon the data obtained from 
the trajectories that matched the first stage 
impact point we tried to find a crude fit for the 
propellant loading of the third stage. Using a 
range of propellant loadings from 1600 kg to 
2000 kg for the third stage and a propellant 
fraction of 0.82 (assumed to be compatible 
with North Korea’s technological capabilities) 
we estimated the velocity required of a third 
stage to achieve orbit after carrying out a yaw 
maneuver to change the orbit inclination plane 
from 88 degrees to 97.4 degrees.24
A propellant loading of 1800 kg with a 
third stage mass of 2195 kg seemed to be a 
reasonable baseline that could not only provide 
the required velocity from the third stage but 
would also reduce the pitch down maneuver 
requirements of the second stage needed to 
reach the 500 km altitude.25
An 1800 kg propellant and a 0.82 
propellant fraction for the third stage 
yields a vehicle with a liftoff weight 
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79495 Kg.26 This revised configuration 
was the second baseline for further 
optimization studies.
This revised configuration of the 
Unha provided a much better starting 
point for the iterative process that 
would match the impact points for the 
first stage, the shroud and the second 
stage.
Through a systematic trial and error 
process an initial pitch angle of 88.93, 
a launch azimuth of 174 degrees with a 
sea level specific impulse of 229 seconds 
for the first stage provided a good match 
for the first stage impact point.
While we were carrying out this 
exercise South Korea made public its 
debris report. The report suggested 
that the thrust of the four Nodong 
cluster booster with the vernier engines 
that constituted the first stage of the 
Unha launcher was 120 tonnes. We 
tried to use this value initially in our 
trajectory analysis. However with the 
configuration that we had derived 
from the image analysis work this 
level of thrust was not very effective in 
providing a suitable first and second 
stage performance for achieving orbit. 
A thrust of about 128 tonnes for the 
first stage was found to fit well and 
this value was therefore used in further 
iterations.
After fixing the initial launch and 
first stage parameters we turned our 
attention to the second stage.
Our trajectory runs indicated 
that even with the revised third 
stage parameters, the second stage 
performance would take the third stage 
and the satellite to altitudes above the 
preferred 500 km orbit altitude. It was 
therefore necessary to pitch down the 
second stage.27 Along with this it is also 
necessary to make sure that at the end 
of the coasting of the third stage (after 
the second stage has separated) the 
altitude and velocity are compatible 
with the needs of the realized 500 km 
sun synchronous orbit.
So far in all this analyses we had assumed 
that the second stage used a Nodong engine 
derivative and a thrust that was similar to that 
of the Nodong. However as we were trying to 
carry out our optimization of the second stage 
with the introduction of pitch down maneuvers 
for the second stage some new findings were 
put out in the public domain from a group in 
Germany. In this they claimed that they had 
enough evidence to show that the second stage 
26 One of the questions as whether the third stage dimensions can accommodate so much propellant. Measurements 
on the more recent image of the Unha launcher suggest that the third stage of Unha launcher is longer and can 
accommodate about 2000 kg of propellant.
27 However with the more realistic weights for the third stage the velocity requirements for this pitch down of the 
second stage become much less making it compatible with the physical measurements obtained from the image 
analysis.
28 The link to the webinar by Markus Schiller who worked on the December 12 Unha launch is provided by David 
Wright in the piece that he posted on the net. It is available at http://allthingsnuclear.org/markus-schillers-
analysis-of-north-koreas-unha-3-launcher/In this oral presentation Schiller makes a case for a lower thrust second 
stage for the Unha launcher as well as a strong case for an advanced third stage. He also suggests that these stages 
are designed primarily for a space mission and are not ideal for use as stages in a missile.
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was not an engine based on a Nodong missile 
design but rather an engine that was specifically 
designed for a satellite launch application28. 
They suggested that the thrust of this engine 
was about 15 tonnes or even less. The other 
conclusions they came to was very similar to 
our own findings of a low specific impulse first 
stage, a medium specific impulse second stage 
and a high specific impulse third stage.
Taking this additional input into 
account we decided to revisit the 
performance of the second stage and 
rework the trajectory once again. 
We also decided to introduce a pitch 
correction based on an offset of the 
thrust axis.29After experimenting with both 
higher thrusts and lower thrusts30 we came to 
the conclusion that a thrust of 150000 Newtons 
for the second stage31 along with a pitch down 
maneuver in which the thrust axis is offset by 
3.5 degrees for 25 seconds after second stage 
ignition gave good results.32 Since the pitch down 
maneuver also takes away some propellant 
it was also necessary to increase the specific 
impulse of the second stage to 269 seconds for 
realizing the 500 km sun synchronous orbit.33 
We also needed to increase the propellant 
loading of the second stage from 8755 Kg to 
8866 kg while reducing the inert weight of the 
stage from 2327 Kg to 2217 kg.34 With these 
changes we were able to match the latitudes of 
the impact points for the first stage and second 
stage quite well. However the longitude error 
though acceptable was still on the higher side. 
By changing the initial launch azimuth from 
174 to 174.5 degrees the error in longitude 
was also reduced. The shroud impact point was 
matched by releasing it at 143 seconds.
Using the improved and revised 
baseline for the first two stages we 
could then look at the third stage 
performance that would yield the 
required orbit. Starting systematically with 
no yaw maneuver and a specific impulse of 260 
seconds we progressed in a step by step fashion 
to initiate both the yaw maneuver and the final 
velocity addition to achieve orbit. For us to 
be able to achieve the desired inclination and 
orbit we had to significantly change the specific 
impulse of the third stage from an initial value 
of 260 seconds to 288 seconds.35
The trajectory that provides a reasonable 
fit with the achieved orbit required the third 
stage to coast for a period of about 475 seconds. 
29 Our model allows for the pitch correction to be done instantaneously with no consumption of 
propellant or for the correction to be performed by changing the angle of thrust of the main 
engine and the duration of such thrust. The thrust axis offset in our trajectory run was set at 3.5 degrees 
and the duration was fixed at 25 seconds. Both of these can be varied in the model.
30 The original thrust we had assumed was 210000 Newton’s for the second stage. We experimented with a thrust of 
260000 Newton’s as well as 160000 Newton’s. The final value we arrived at that gave the best results was a thrust 
of 150000 Newton’s for the second stage. Though the German group had suggested a thrust even lower than 15 
tonnes we find that thrusts lower than 150000 Newton’s may not be sufficient to achieve orbit.
31 This translates into a thrust of 15.29 tonnes for the second stage.
32 This notion of a reduced thrust came from Markus Schiller and our analysis draws upon that. See footnote 28.
33 The additional specific impulse is also required to match the impact point of the second stage.
34 This means that the propellant fraction of the second stage increases from 0.79 to 0.80.
35 Increasing the propellant loading beyond 1800 kg may not be a feasible option since the measurements from the 
image put a limit on the tank size. The measurements do not however rule out the possibility that the propellant 
loading can go up to 2000 kg.
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The altitude and velocity of the third stage at 
this point in time are about 499 km and 3.521 
Km per second respectively. At this point a yaw 
36 In practice this calls for a re-orientation of the third stage to align the thrust axis with the required yaw direction 
(an azimuth change) followed by the firing of the third stage engine. In our trajectory model this is done in steps. 
The total azimuth change and the number of steps can be changed to achieve the desired inclination change 
through an iterative process.
37 The trajectory results give an inclination of 97.433 degrees with an apogee of 588 km and a perigee of 494 km. 
This matches almost perfectly with the parameters put out by footnote 1
38 For a booster stage it is more appropriate to use the sea level thrust and Isp values. Based on empirical data typical 
variation of thrust with altitude has been modeled and incorporated into our trajectory software. A 10% variation 
in thrust and a similar variation in Isp values seem appropriate based on a sample of values estimated from typical 
booster stages. For the upper stages it is more appropriate to use vacuum values of thrust as well as Isp.
Table 2: Trajectory Reconstruction – 
Comparison of Initial and Final Vehicle 







Propellant mass stage 1 (kg) 55287 55287
Inert mass stage2 (kg) 10531 10531
Stage mass (kg) 65817 65817
Fuel fraction 0.84 0.84
Thrust Sea level (Newtons)38 1318598 1254957
Isp Sea Level (seconds) 232 229
Burn time computed (seconds) 95.33 98.935
Area of cross section (m2) 4.52 4.52
Stage 2 Parameters
Propellant mass stage 2 (kg) 8755 8866
Inert mass stage 2 (kg) 2327 2217
Stage mass (kg) 11083 11083
Fuel fraction 0.79 0.80
Thrust (Newtons) 210000 150000
Isp vacuum(seconds) 255 269
Burn time computed (seconds) 104.29 155.92
Area of cross section (m2) 1.52 1.52
Stage 3 Parameters
Propellant mass stage 3 (kg) 1449 1800
Inert mass stage 3 (kg) 318 294
Stage mass (kg) 1767 2094
Fuel fraction 0.82 0.86
Thrust (Newtons) 93000 93000
Isp vacuum(seconds) 260 288
Burn time computed (seconds) 40 54.66
Area of cross section(m2) 1.02 1.02
Satellite mass (kg) 100 100
Shroud mass (kg) 300 300
Lift off weight (kg) 79067 79395
maneuver is initiated.36 The maneuver calls 
for a total change of 10.66 degrees in 10 steps 
spread out over 10 seconds.
After the yaw maneuver is completed 
the third stage engine is fired for another 41 
seconds for achieving the final orbit.
Such a trajectory matches well with the 
known impact points of the first stage, the 
second stage, and is reasonably close to the final 
achieved orbit of the North Korean satellite.37 It 
also suggests that even if the first stage used a 
RFNA kerosene combination, the second stage 
has to have an improved engine with a specific 
impulse of about 270 seconds. Our trajectory 
simulation also pointed to an advanced third 
stage that delivers a specific impulse of around 
288 seconds.
The Lift-Off Weight (LOW) of this final 
configuration that best fits the known impact 
points, the achieved orbit with the simulated 
trajectory of the launcher was 79395 Kg. 
Table 2 compares the original stage 
parameters assumed for our trajectory analyses 
and the final values that seem to provide the 
best fit to the impact points of the first stage, the 
shroud, the second stage and the achieved orbit.
the fit betweeN the 
recoNstructed trajectory  
aNd the impact ZoNes 
How good is the fit between the constructed 
trajectory and the impact areas for the first 
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stage, the shroud and the second stage notified 
by North Korea?
Our final trajectory gives the impact point 
of the spent first stage as 35.357 N Latitude 
and 124.771E Longitude. The impact point 
of the shroud is 33.064 N Latitude 124.756 E 
Longitude.39 Figure 1 is a Google Earth rendition 
of the impact point of the first stage and the 
shroud within the area notified by North Korea 
for the first stage. We can see that the 
trajectory fits well with the mid points 
of the areas notified by North Korea as 
the impact areas for the first stage and 
the shroud.
Figure 1
39 This matches well with the midpoint of the impact zone notified by North Korea for the first stage which lies at 35.357 
N and 124.723 E as well as the midpoint of the impact zone for the shroud which lies at 33.036 N 124.622 E.
40 The midpoint of the impact zone notified by North Korea for the second stage is at 16.867 N and 124.261 E.
41 The injection point of the satellite as per our trajectory is at 27.758 N and 124.268 E.
Figure 2 shows the impact point of the 
second stage at 16.895 N and 124.350 E from 
the final trajectory run within the area notified 
by North Korea.40
We can see from Figure 2 that the match 
between the trajectory and the midpoint of the 
impact zone notified for the second stage is 
very good.
Figure 3 shows the injection point of the 
satellite using a Google Earth rendition.
The injection of the satellite happens well 
before the impact of the second stage.41
The injection point is also seen to be 
away from the plane of the trajectory of the 
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second stage which is consistent with the yaw 
maneuver required to place the satellite in a sun 
synchronous orbit.
We can conclude from the above that the 
reconstructed trajectory provides impact points 
for the first stage, the shroud and the second 
stage which are reasonably close to the midpoints 
of the impact zones notified by North Korea.
Our trajectory results are therefore 
consistent with the notified impact points 
for the first stage, the shroud and the second 
stage. If we can further establish that the orbit 
achieved by the addition of a suitable third 
stage is also consistent with the achieved orbit 
we can infer that our trajectory reconstruction 
is a reasonable approximation of the actual 
orbit achieved by the Unha Launcher.
the recoNstructed trajectory 
aNd the achieved orbit
For achieving a sun synchronous orbit one 
of the key requirements is the inclination of the 
orbital plane. For a 500 km sun synchronous 
orbit this inclination is 97.4 degrees.
Our Reconstructed Trajectory provided 
the orbit given in Table 3. Estimates of these 
parameters based on the six line elements 
provided by NORAD immediately after launch 
are also shown in Table 3 to use as a benchmark 
for comparing the results from our reconstructed 
trajectory.
We can see from Table 3 that our trajectory 
fits well with the achieved orbit.
Taken together with the fit obtained for 
the impact points of stage1, the shroud and 
the second stage the trajectory that we have 
reconstructed does seem to be reasonably close 
to the actual Unha trajectory.
Table 3: Comparison of Trajectory and 
NORAD Orbit Parameters
Parameter Our Trajectory NORAD42
Inclination (Degrees) 97.433° 97.4067°
Apogee (Km) 588.14Km 588 Km
Perigee  (Km) 493.92 Km 494 Km
Period (Minutes) 95.2872667 95.5407
Semi-major axis (Km) 6912.030 6918.4 Km
Eccentricity 0.007 0.0061309
trajectory details
Figure 4 provides a velocity time line 
for the operation of the three stages and the 
insertion into orbit.
Annexure 1 provides a detailed time line 
of the major events from the final run of our 
trajectory model.
Figure 5 provides the altitude range plot 
for the first stage and the shroud.
Figure 6 provides the altitude versus range 
plot for the second stage.
As we can see from Figures 1 and 
2 these impact points are close to the 
midpoints of impact zones notified 
by North Korea. This validates to a 
large extent our reconstruction of the 
trajectory for stages one and two.
42 The relevant orbital parameters have been taken or derived from the six line orbital elements data put out by 
NORAD with an epoch 12-12-2012 (December 12, 2012) and time 03:52:35 UT. Since the launch time as sug-
gested in footnote 1 was 00:49:00.51 the parameters are those put out immediately after launch.
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Figure 5: Stage 1 Shroud Impact Trajectories
Figure 6: Stage 2 Impact Trajectory
Figure 4: Velocity versus Time Unha
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43 See footnote 28.
44 Reference 1 provides the detail that the launch took place at 00:49:00.51 UT. This reference based on NORAD 
data also says that the local time of equatorial crossing at the descending node is 09:00 hours.
equatorial crossiNg time & the 
fit betweeN the trajectory aNd 
achieved orbit
One of the issues that has come out of the 
analysis of Schiller and also validated by our 
reconstructed trajectory is the performance 
of the second stage.43 The trajectory suggests 
that the second stage has a lower thrust engine 
designed more for a space mission rather than 
an engine developed for a missile application 
that has been used to launch a satellite. Is there 
any way in which we could validate this via our 
trajectory model?
If the second stage or for that matter any 
other stage uses a lower thrust engine it will 
take a longer time for the satellite to achieve 
orbital velocity. During this time the earth is 
also rotating from west to east and therefore the 
injection point will be further away to the east. 
If we know the launch time and from the orbit 
we know where precisely the achieved orbit 
crosses the equator on its downward path for 
the first time we can get an estimate of the local 
time of crossing at the equator. This local time 
of equatorial crossing in the descending mode 
is a normal parameter specified for remote 
sensing satellites in a sun synchronous orbit. 
The longer the duration of the ascent trajectory 
the later will be the equatorial crossing time in 
the descending node.
From our trajectory and orbit model and 
the launch time put in the public domain we 
tried to estimate the first southbound equatorial 
crossing local time for North Korea’s satellite.
Our trajectory model gives a total flight 
time of 526 seconds for the insertion of the 
satellite into orbit.
The satellite crosses the equator on its 
downward path at about 967 seconds after 
launch. The equatorial crossing point has a 
Longitude of 118.491 E Longitude.
Knowing the launch time, the time taken 
for the satellite to cross the equator on its 
first descending node and the longitude of 
this equatorial crossing point we can easily 
compute the local equatorial crossing time for 
the descending node. We can then compare 
this with the equatorial crossing time put out 
in the public domain to check whether this is 
consistent with our trajectory model and the 
total flight time of the launcher to insert a 
satellite into orbit.
Our calculation from the trajectory 
indicates that the first local time of equatorial 
crossing in the descending node is 08hrs:59 
minutes: 5.35 seconds.
According to reference 1 “US tracking then 
cataloged object 39026 as 2012-072A in a 494 
x 588 km x 97.4 degree sun-synchronous orbit 
with a 0900 local time descending node”44.
Using the first Two Line Elements (TLE) data 
put out by NORAD, corresponding to epoch 
December 12 2012 and 03 52 52.35 UTC, the 
equator crossing time was also computed by 
propagating the orbit. The equator crossing 
time is 04h 16m 35s UTC. Longitude of equator 
crossing is 70.72deg. Therefore, the Local time 
of equator crossing as per this is 08h 59m 27s. 
We can see that our trajectory time of equatorial 
crossing compares reasonably well with the 
computed time from the first TLE.
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There is a difference of about 22 seconds 
between the trajectory value and the computed 
value based on the NORAD TLE data. This 
would suggest that the overall launch duration 
of the Unha is a little more than that computed 
by our trajectory. There could be many reasons 
for this including lower thrusts for one or all of 
the stages or a longer coasting time.
From all the available evidence which 
includes the impact points of the first stage, the 
shroud, the second stage as well as the orbital 
parameter which includes the inclination, the 
perigee, the apogee as well as the equatorial 
crossing time of the sun synchronous orbit 
achieved we can conclude that our trajectory 
captures the actual trajectory of the Unha 
Launcher reasonably well.
Therefore our vehicle parameters for 
the stages, our assumptions regarding the 
specific impulses of the various stages and 
our maneuvers for the different stages to 
reach the prescribed orbit are consistent with 
the empirical evidence available in the public 
domain on the Unha vehicle.
This validated derived information 
therefore provides a useful basis for making an 
assessment of North Korea’s capabilities in the 
missile and space launcher domain.
the uNha as a ballistic missile
One of the worries that the US has voiced 
publicly is the ability of North Korea’s missile 
to hit various parts of the US. Table 4 provides 
details of the maximum range of the Unha 
launched in different directions with a 1000 
kg payload. The Table also provides the range 
estimate that we had made after the failed April 
2012 launch of the Unha.45
We can see from Table 4 that our current 
assessment of the range of the Unha Launcher 
as a Ballistic Missile is about 700 to 1000 Km 
lower than our earlier estimates based on the 
failed April 2012 launch.
This reduction is in spite of the fact that 
the overall mass of the Unha has increased to 
about 80 tonnes as compared to our April 2102 
assessment of about 70 tonnes. The specific 
impulses of the stages in our assessment of the 
April 2012 launch were 255 seconds (vacuum 
Isp), 255 seconds (vacuum Isp) and 260 
seconds (vacuum Isp) respectively. In contrast 
in our current assessment the specific impulses 
for stage 1, stage 2 and stage 3 are 229 seconds 
(sea level Isp)46, 269 seconds (vacuum Isp) 
and 288 (vacuum Isp) respectively. This would 
suggest that the range of the Unha should be 
more than our estimate for the April 2012 
launch. The fact that the range is less with 
higher quantities of propellants and higher 
specific impulses especially for the second and 
third stage validates the point that the Unha 
configuration is optimized for a space mission 
45 Footnote 7 Table 2 p 15
46 This may translate into a vacuum level Isp of about 252 seconds.






Range Earlier NIAS 
Estimate (Km)
Range Current NIAS 
Estimate (Km)
39.66 N 124.705 E 1000 Kg Due North (0) 6766 Km 5949 Km
39.66 N 124.705 E 1000 Kg Due East (90) 7726 Km 6724 Km
39.66 N 124.705 E 1000 Kg Due South (180) 6787 Km 5965 Km
39.66 N 124.705 E 1000 Kg Due West (270) 6180 Km 5478 Km
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with a significantly lower thrust for the critical 
second stage. The evidence therefore is clear 
that the Unha has been specifically designed for 
a space mission and has not been derived from 
missile stages that might have been available 
to North Korea. It can of course use this as a 
missile though it may not be optimized for such 
a mission.
Our trajectory also suggests that a due 
North East launch at an azimuth of about 45 
degrees from the Launch site with a 1000 kg 
payload (sufficient for a nuclear warhead) can 
reach most parts of Alaska.
North Korea’s missile aNd 
space lauNch capabilities – aN 
assessmeNt
The available evidence indicates that the 
first stage of the Unha Launcher comprises 
a cluster of four Nodong Engines that have a 
common turbo pump and common tanks for the 
kerosene propellant and the RFNA oxidizer.
From Table 2 we can see clearly that the 
first stage sea level specific impulse that best 
fits the trajectory is only 229 seconds. This is on 
the lower side of what can be achieved with a 
RFNA Kerosene oxidizer fuel combination. Even 
if it were so North Korea has been able to put 
together a cluster of Nodong engines to provide 
the initial boost for a space launcher.
It is common knowledge that North Korea 
developed the Nodong missile from scaling-up 
of the Scud A technology. This is the technology 
that they exported to Pakistan and Iran. 
Evidence from the Unha Launch indicates that 
North Korea has been able to further scale up 
and cluster four of these engines to provide a 
booster for a space launcher. The addition of the 
four vernier engines and their integration into 
a unified stage with autonomous control also 
represents a significant move away from the 
crude graphite jet vane control systems of the 
early Scud A technology used in the Nodong, 
Pakistan’s Ghauri as well as Iran’s Shahab 3. 
Though the technology is old the scaling up 
and improvements do indicate significant 
capabilities within North Korea.
We can also see that the second stage 
specific impulse that best fits the trajectory is 
about 270 seconds. The thrust of the engine 
that powers this stage is also much lower than 
that of the Nodong engine suggesting that the 
stage and the engine are optimized for a satellite 
launch.47 These indicate that the second stage 
most probably uses a UDMH RFNA fuel and 
oxidizer combination that is consistent with the 
Scud B technology of the Soviet era which used 
this propellant oxidizer combination to improve 
the performance of the Scud series of missiles.
The assumption that was made by analysts 
including us was that the second stage of the 
Unha missile was powered by a Nodong missile 
engine. The evidence from the current launch 
substantiated by other indirect pointers as 
well as our trajectory results suggest that this 
stage uses a much lower thrust higher specific 
impulse engine that has been specially designed 
for the Unha launcher. Though it would have 
been easier for North Korea to have used a 
regular missile engine for the Unha second 
stage they choose to develop an engine and 
stage specifically designed for a satellite 
mission. This once again indicates a substantial 
in-house capability that has built upon imported 
or borrowed technology to not only improve it 
but to use the knowledge acquired to scale-up, 
47 Schiller – Footnote 28 – was possibly the earliest to point this out.
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re-design, develop, test and launch a new stage.
Our Trajectory Model also suggests that 
the third stage uses an advanced engine with 
a specific impulse of about 288 seconds. The 
results also suggest that this is a light weight 
stage with a high propellant load factor of 
around 86%. The engine that powers this stage 
also possibly uses an advanced propellant 
oxidizer combination such as UDMH and 
Nitrogen Tetroxide. This propellant and 
oxidizer combination was not used in the Scud 
series development. North Korea’s possession 
of this stage indicates that they have the 
knowledge and capabilities to design, develop, 
test and integrate such an advanced engine 
and stage into a space launcher. This is no 
mean achievement for a supposedly backward 
country like North Korea.
Apart from these hard technological 
achievements related to the development of the 
propulsion units and the stages for the Unha, 
the launch provides visible evidence that North 
Korea has been able to integrate these hard 
technologies with the softer technologies of 
mission planning and management of a complex 
project. The vehicle trajectory including the 
maneuvers after liftoff, the pitching down of 
the second stage after first stage separation, 
maintaining control during the fairly long coast 
phase, the yaw maneuver of the third stage 
and the final injection into a fairly good sun 
synchronous orbit shows a strong and well-
developed internal organization of effort within 
North Korea. The division of work and the 
integration of these various diverse subsystems 
and components into a whole launcher and the 
planning and execution of the launch mission 
show that North Korea has made commendable 
progress in its mastery of missile and space 
launcher products and technologies.
These suggest that North Korea is 
somewhat more advanced than either Iran 
or Pakistan in space and missile technologies 
and products. This more than the actual 
performance of the Unha launcher as a missile 
must be a source of considerable concern to 
North Korea’s immediate neighbours as well as 
the United States.
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Timeline of Major Events Unha December 2012 Satellite Launch
Time (seconds) Event Altitude (Km) Range (Km) Velocity (Km / sec)
0 sec Vertical Lift off 0 Km 0 Km 0 Km / sec 
5 sec Pitch Down 88.93, 
Azimuth 174.5 
0.077 Km 0 Km 0.031 Km / sec
53 sec Maximum Q 11.515 Km 3.88 Km 0.557 Km / sec 
98.94 sec Stage 1 Burnout 53.42 Km 34.80 Km 1.957 Km / sec
98.94 sec Stage 2 ignition Pitch 
Down 
53.42 Km 34.80 Km 1.957 Km / sec
125 sec Pitch down stage 2 
completed
91.32 Km 70.52 Km 2.08 Km / sec 
143 sec Shroud release 118.54 Km 100.24 Km 2.21 Km / sec
255 sec Stage 2 Burnout 286 Km 367 Km 4.009 Km / sec 
255 sec Stage 3 Coast 286 Km 367 Km 4.009 Km / sec 
475 sec Yaw maneuver 
initiated
498.6 Km 1101 Km 3.521 Km / sec 
485 sec Yaw Maneuver 
Completed
500.53 Km 1133.16 Km 3.517 Km / sec 
485 sec Orbit insertion firing 500.53 Km 1133.16 Km 3.517 Km / sec 
526 sec Satellite separation – 
Orbit 
503.883 Km 1324.08 Km 7.715 Km / sec 
967 sec Equatorial crossing 
south 
521.75 Km 4453.55 Km 7.699 Km / sec 
aNNexure 1


